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4Preface
This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four essays. The first essay has
been published in Journal of Economics and is reprinted here by the permission of
Springer-Verlag. The third essay, written together with Vesa Kanniainen (Univer-
sity of Helsinki), has been accepted for publication in International Journal of In-
dustrial Organization and appears here with the permission of Elsewier Science.
The fourth essay is a joint work with Klaus Kultti (Helsinki School of Economics
and Business Administration). Section 7 of this essay draws heavily on our article
in Economics Letters and is used here with the permission of Elsewier Science.
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6The Economics of Intellectual
Property Protection: An Over-
view
1 Introduction
Technological progress depends on the diffusion of new technologies through imi-
tation as much as through invention. The welfare effects of the dissemination of
knowledge through imitation have been a topic of interest at least since Plato. In
the last pages of Plato's Philebus there is a dialogue which gives some sense of the
issue at stake. Socrates and Protachos try to see whether imitation should be in-
cluded in the socially optimal ‘mixture’ of knowledge. Plato assumes that learning
and imitation is ‘harmless’ and, as well-known, in the Platonic economy genuine
invention is impossible because the basic ideas are eternal. The conclusion in
Philebus that all skills and knowledge achieved through imitation are socially de-
sirable is therefore hardly surprising:
‘..what harm it can do a man to take in all the other kinds of knowledge (through
imitation) if he has the first (the eternal ideas).’ (Plato Philebus, 62D, parentheses
added)
But Plato merely observes the benefits of imitation. The cost side is explained by
Jeremy Bentham:
‘He who has no hope that he shall reap, will not take the trouble to sow. But that
which one man has invented, all the world can imitate.’ (Jeremy Bentham The
Works of Jeremy Bentham, 1843, vol. 3, p. 71)
Adding this undesirable impact of imitation on the incentive to innovate and the
imitation cost into Plato’s model, it seems that the socially acceptable degree of
imitation should be restricted.
Overlooking the appropriability problems associated with knowledge spillovers,
the analysis in Philebus sounds trivial, but evaluating it in historical perspective is
difficult for a non-specialist. In a fascinating historical inquiry, Long (1991) finds
but little evidence of the undesirable impact of imitation on innovation in antiquity.
Knowledge spillovers were not considered a problem until the rise of capitalism
early this millennium. In consequence, the development of the institutions to pro-
tect intellectual property, particularly the patent system, is unrelated to the devel-
opment of inventive activity directly. Inventive activity is an inherent characteristic
of the human being, and most major innovations had been made well before legal
7protection of intellectual property became known.1 Only when inventors began re-
garding their inventions as a property did they begin seeking protection for it.
The development of the legislation to protect intellectual property is therefore
related to the evolution of proprietary attitudes toward intellectual output. Long
(1991) emphasises the role of medieval craft guilds in promoting these attitudes,
the main purposes of the guilds including the maintenance of secrecy concerning
the craft techniques. This change in attitudes towards new technology finally led to
a novel institutional arrangement to protect intellectual property. The practice of
granting a privilege, a patent, for the possession of new devices or knowledge dates
back to 13th century Europe. The Venetian Senate passed the first general patent
law codifying a common practice on March 19, 1474.
The importance of this development can hardly be underestimated. In accor-
dance with Ronald Coase’s (1960) famous hypothesis, if there are transaction
costs, the institutional arrangements matter. Inventive work and the protection of
its results necessitate transaction costs, and the patent institution did matter:
‘The development of an incentive structure through patent laws, trade secret laws,
and other laws raised the rate of return on innovation and also led to the develop-
ment of the inventive industry and its integration into the way economies evolved in
the Western world in modern times, which in turn underlay the Second Economic
Revolution’ (Douglas C. North Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance, 1990, p.75)
The economic underpinning of intellectual property protection is simple. Despite
the short-run welfare losses, to encourage inventive effort government should grant
inventors,
‘in a case of their success, a monopoly of the trade for a certain number of years. It
is the easiest and most natural way in which the state can recompense them for haz-
arding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is afterwards to
reap the benefit.’ (Adam Smith Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations, 1904 (originally published in 1776), Book V, pp. 277–278)
The fundamental problem in the economics of intellectual property protection is
the public good aspect of inventive output. On the one hand, intellectual property
does not wear out and it is thus wasteful to restrict its use. On the other hand, with-
out the protection of intellectual property, inventors cannot fully appropriate the
return on their work, and, in consequence, there is too little innovation in the econ-
omy. This dilemma of Scylla and Charybdis also underlies this dissertation. Ac-
cepting that market failure in creating intellectual property rights justifies govern-
ment intervention raises the question of how intellectual property should be pro-
tected and how long.
Beside this normative aspect of intellectual property protection, the essays in
this dissertation aim to contribute to the positive analysis by investigating how the
existing means of protection influence the supply and diffusion of innovation. In
practice, there are myriad devices to appropriate inventive returns. The legal pro-
                                                     
1According to Niiniluoto (1994) the most welfare-increasing innovation of all time is the ability to
write, since it has enabled unprecedented diffusion of knowledge. Other such major innovations in-
clude agriculture, fire and the wheel.
8tection of intellectual property has been traditionally divided into two main
branches. Industrial property protection deals principally with industrial designs,
patents, trademarks and service marks, trade secrets, and appellations of origin.
Copyright protection usually applies to artistic, audiovisual, literary, musical, and
photographic works. In addition to legal protection, other instruments including
lead-time, research joint ventures, and secrecy can provide substantial protection
for innovators. The emphasis of this dissertation is not only on patent protection,
but copyright protection, research joint ventures, and secrecy are also considered.
In the following section of this introductory chapter the assumptions of the four
core essays and some central findings of the literature are spelled out in more de-
tail. The discussion does not to pretend to be a thorough review of the literature, as
there are several extensive surveys such as Kaufer (1989), Besen and Raskind
(1991), De Bondt (1996), Lanjouw and Lerner (1997), Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam
(1998) and Veugelers (1998) on various aspects of intellectual property protection.
The contents and main findings of the essays are summarised in section 3. Some
concluding remarks can be found in section 4.
2 The Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property
Rights
Joseph A. Schumpeter says of Jeremy Bentham’s entrepreneur theory that:
‘It is a curious fact (curious, that is, considering the tremendous influence that Ben-
tham exerted in other respects) that his views on this subject—which were not fully
given to the public until the posthumous publication of his collected works—re-
mained almost unnoticed by professional economists’ (Schumpeter, 1949, p. 64)
Curiously enough, exactly the same can be said about Bentham’s patent theory.
The theory is developed in full length in his Manual of Political Economy, which
was completed by 1795, in a section entitled ‘Of patents or exclusive privileges for
inventions, and the expediency of granting them’.2 The analysis encapsulates prac-
tically all relevant economic aspects of patent protection:
 i) The dynamic inefficiency associated with large knowledge spillovers
 ii) The static inefficiency associated with small knowledge spillovers
 iii) The innovator’s choice between secrecy and patents as a protection instru-
ment
 iv) The comparison between patents and prizes as instruments of technology
policy
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 Cheung (1986) led me to observe Jeremy Bentham’s contribution to this issue. However, Cheung
(1986) exclusively refers to the Works of Jeremy Bentham in which patents are mentioned only in
passing. Moreover, William Stark, the editor of Jeremy Bentham’s Economic Writings (1952), ar-
gues that the Works of Jeremy Bentham is an unreliable source, especially as far as Manual of Po-
litical Economy is considered.
9Bentham’s theory is especially advanced in the first point, since he clearly de-
scribes the necessity for intellectual property protection to encourage innovation. In
addition to Bentham, some other early writers such as J. B. Say (1827), John Stuart
Mill (1848) and J. B. Clark (1907) held positive views on the legal protection of
intellectual property. F. W. Taussig (1915), however, argues that ‘the patent sys-
tem...is a huge mistake’ (Taussig, 1915, p. 18). This conclusion is wholeheartedly
supported by A. C. Pigou (1920) and A. Plant (1934a), Plant (1934b) extending the
argument to apply to copyright protection. Plant (1934a) even asks whether the
patent system is partly responsible for the Great Depression of the 30s.
Despite these exceptions, the study of economic consequences of intellectual
property rights did not take off, however. One reason was surely that the process
by which innovation influences economic growth was poorly understood before
Schumpeter (1911),3 and even so, some influential empirical studies such as
Abramowitz (1956) and Solow (1957) were required to make the economists fully
grasp the significance of technological progress in economic growth. Research on
innovation subsequently exploded. Considerable effort was directed towards the
hypothesis derived from the works of Schumpeter (1942) and Galbraith (1952) that
monopolies and big companies are conducive to innovation. This proposition can
be broken down into a number of more precise hypotheses including the one pre-
dicting that a properly designed system of intellectual property rights increases so-
cial welfare by boosting innovation.
Early studies including Arrow (1962) and Usher (1964) describe how the in-
centive to innovate deteriorates with an increasing level of knowledge spillovers.
William Nordhaus (1969) was the first to offer a rigorous model explaining the
fundamental trade-off between static and dynamic considerations in designing pat-
ent policy: if one wants to spur innovative activity, it is possible only at the ex-
pense of the competition. Since Nordhaus’s seminal works (1969) and (1972) there
has been extensive research on patent protection and its consequences for social
welfare. This theoretical literature on patents can loosely be divided into two main
strands. These strands are not independent or exhaustive, and do overlap, but they
have been chosen for pragmatic reasons. The first, in which the studies by Nord-
haus belong, deals with the effects of patents on post-innovation market structure.
The focus in this Nordhausian tradition is on the socially optimal term and scope of
patent protection, even though other policy issues such as optimal renewal fees and
novelty criterion have also recently been taken into closer consideration. These
issues are enlarged upon especially in section 2.1 but also to some extent in sec-
tions 2.2–2.3.
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 As Dasgupta (1988) points out, Schumpeter did not make much advance over Karl Marx on this
point. Nonetheless, Schumpeter gave innovation a different weight to Marx, who highlighted capital
accumulation. In any case, neither Marx nor Schumpeter developed a theory of intellectual property
protection. Given that Schumpeter explicitly glorifies innovation at the expense of invention (see,
e.g. Schumpeter, 1911, p. 178, Schumpeter, 1934, pp. 88-89, Schumpeter, 1947, and Schumpeter,
1954, p. 556) it is quite understandable that he mentions patents and other intellectual property
rights only in passing (see e.g. Schumpeter, 1942, p. 88 and pp. 102-103, Schumpeter, 1947, and
Schumpeter, 1949). As to Marx, it is clear to me only that he had no illusions about perfect patent
protection. He maintains in Lohnarbeit und Kapital (1849) that since competition quickly destroys
monopolies for new methods and devices, a capitalist must try to beat competitors by employing
newer and newer machines.
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The second strand considers the impact of patents on the supply of innovation.
Briefly, during the 70s the economists, notably Morton Kamien and Nancy
Schwartz,4 introduced a stochastic payoff structure with many technically conven-
ient properties, the Poisson distribution, into the analysis of innovation. Kamien
and Schwartz (1974a) almost immediately adapted this to the study of patent pol-
icy, but only when this was organised in terms of game theoretical principles by
Loury’s (1979), Lee and Wilde’s (1980), Dasgupta and Stigliz’s (1980), and Rein-
ganum’s (1981a) subsequent contributions, did the second programme began to
dominate research. This so-called patent-race literature is surveyed by Beath, Kat-
soulacos and Ulph (1989), Reinganum (1989) and Martin (1993). With some nota-
ble exceptions such as Kamien and Schwartz (1974a), Reinganum (1982) and Del-
bono and Denicolò (1991), however, the role of patents in the patent-race literature
is somewhat degenerate. The ‘winner takes all’ assumption dominates, that is, pat-
ent protection is assumed to be perfect. During the 90s, research has again mainly
been conducted in the spirit of Nordhaus, helping to focus more attention on the
role of patents.
In an excellent paper Denicolò (1996) reconciles these two strands. He demon-
strates within a unified framework that seemingly contradictory results in different
approaches, including Tandon (1982), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Klemperer
(1990), and Gallini (1992), are caused by the dissimilar influences of patent
breadth on social welfare and post-innovation profits in these models. Denicolò’s
(1996) findings clearly deserve careful consideration, and they are assessed in de-
tail in the following section.
While a majority of the economists now adhere to the prevailing systems pro-
tecting intellectual property, the claim in Taussig (1915), Pigou (1920) and Plant
(1934a, 1934b) that such protection is detrimental to social welfare still persists.
Several modern writers such as Barzel (1968), Loury (1979), and Lee and Wilde
(1980) argue that competition between potential innovators under perfect patent
protection leads to excessive inventive effort. This argument is addressed in the
general equilibrium of an economy with imperfect intellectual property protection
in the second essay of the thesis.
The prospects for welfare-improving patent policy can also be restricted by the
innovator’s option of keeping the innovation secret. As J. B. Say explains un brevet
d’invention:
‘C’est une récompense que le gouvernment accorde aux dépens des consommateurs
de nouveau produit; et...cette récompense est souvent trés-considérable.’ (J. B. Say
Traité d’economie politique, 1827, vol. 1, p. 279).
There is little to add to this explanation. Patents and other forms of legal protection
must enable the innovator to extract sufficiently large gains from consumers to
make them profitable to apply for, and nothing guarantees that the reward making
application profitable is not too great from the social welfare point of view.
While there is a considerable literature on the patent institution, economists
should recognise the variety of the legislation to protect intellectual property in-
cluding other industrial property protection and copyright protection. Some eco-
nomic aspects of copyright and some other instruments of protection are briefly
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 See Kamien and Schwartz (1972) for their pioneering contribution and Kamien and Schwartz
(1982) for a summary of their work in this area.
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summarised in section 2.2. Section 2.3 contains an introduction to secrecy as an
alternative means of protection, as one of the main themes in the essays is the in-
novators’ decision to apply for patent protection instead of keeping innovations
secret, and its implications for patent policy.
2.1 Socially Optimal Patent Length and Breadth
Nordhaus’s (1969) question is simply how long should a patent grant stay in force?
The policy-makers’ problem is to fine-tune the term of patent protection in order to
balance the static and dynamic inefficiencies optimally. To begin the discussion,
consider an inventor with a strictly convex cost function
C(α) = 1
2
Rα2, (1)
where parameter R reflects the exogenous efficiency of the existing invention tech-
nology. It is assumed that R is large enough that in all circumstances α ≤ 1 and,
accordingly, α can be regarded as the success probability of the invention. For
simplicity, I work directly with α instead of treating investment level as a decision
variable. With success the inventor accrues monopoly profits πm during the life of
patent, and some competitive return π  after the patent expires and the innovation
becomes available to everyone. If imitation or entry to the industry is costly after
the patent expires, π  > 0. The legal duration of patent protection, often referred
to simply as patent length, is denoted by T. The inventor’s return on successful in-
ventive effort is thus
P(T) = e dt e dtrt mT rt
T
− −
∞∫ ∫+π π0 , (2)
and the inventor’s problem is thus to choose α so as to maximise
α αP R− 1
2
2
.
The solution is
α =
P
R
. (3)
Equation (3) exhibits the classical rationale for intellectual property protection –
the investments in innovation increase with the duration of protection, that is,
dα/dT>0. Similarly the social return on inventive effort is given by
S(T) = e W dt e Wdtrt mT rt
T
− −
∞∫ ∫+0 , (4)
where W
m
 and W  depict social welfare as the total of consumer surplus and indus-
try profits when the patent is in force and after it expires. The essential distinction
between the private and social return on innovation can be seen by contrasting (4)
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with (2). The private return P increases while the social return S decreases with the
term of protection T. The social planner’s task is then to
max
T
S Rα α− 1
2
2
,
subject to (3). The first-order condition is
αTS = α(RαT-ST), (5)
in which the subscripts denote the derivatives. The trade-off between the static and
dynamic considerations facing the policy-makers can now clearly be observed in
(5), which simply shows that optimal patent life equalises the marginal dynamic
gain of prolonged protection with the marginal static loss. In other words, the left-
hand side of equation (5) explains how an increase in patent life encourages inven-
tive endeavours, but after the innovation is made, consumers are worse off because
inventor’s monopoly lasts longer, as conveyed by the last term on the right-hand
side. Notice that the increased R&D expenses due to the accelerated innovative
effort must also be counted in the welfare losses; this effect is depicted by the term
αRαT on the right-hand side.
Nordhaus’s seminal model outlined above provides a simple description of the
patent system in its original purpose, that is, when a patent affords complete but
temporary protection over an invention. The pertinence of this view is, however,
much in doubt. Since the pioneering study by Mansfield (1961), researchers have
reported overwhelming evidence of the inability of patent protection to prevent
imitation with a few exceptions such as the pharmaceutical industry.5 In a contro-
versy with Scherer (1972), Nordhaus (1972) extends his model to allow imperfect
patent protection. In other words, Nordhaus (1972) formalises the concept of patent
breadth.
While the notion of patent length is indisputable, the meaning of patent breadth,
or patent width, is relatively vague. The width of the patent grant measures the de-
gree of the patent protection. If patents are narrow, a patent is easy to ‘invent
around’, that is, it is easy to produce a non-infringing substitute for the patented
invention. An extremely narrow patent does not protect even against trivial
changes such as changes in colour. This kind of description is too loose to provide
an unambiguous ground for the modelling attempts, and the definition of patent
breadth in the literature varies from one author to another. Nordhaus’s (1972) pio-
neering model deals with process innovations, and he measures patent breadth by
the fraction of the cost reduction not freely spilling over to competitors. In Klem-
perer’s (1990) and Waterson’s (1990) product innovation models, patent breadth
reflects the distance in the product space between the patented product and the
nearest non-infringing substitute. In a similar vein, Matutes, Regibeau and Rockett
(1996) define patent breadth by the number of different applications protected by
the same patent grant.
The simplest definitions of patent width are provided in Gilbert and Shapiro
(1990) and Gallini (1992). In Gallini (1992), the width of the patent is equivalent to
                                                     
5
 Other empirical studies on the rate of imitation include Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981),
Mansfield (1985, 1986, 1993), Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987), Harabi (1995), and
Arundal and Kabla (1998).
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an increase in imitation costs caused by patent protection. Such a view is supported
by the much-cited queries by Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner (1981) and Levin,
Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987). Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) simply identify
the patent breadth with the innovator’s profit while the patent is in force. In doing
so, their analysis also encompasses Tandon’s (1982) investigation of the compul-
sory licensing of patented innovations, because compulsory licensing simply re-
duces the patentee’s profits by facilitating imitation. The compulsory royalty rate,
the patent holder’s profit with compulsory licensing, can thus be equated with the
patent width.
Ambiguous assumptions often lead to ambiguous outcomes, the issue of the so-
cially optimal patent length-breadth mix being no exception. Sometimes the opti-
mal patent has maximum length and minimum breadth, as in Tandon (1982) and
Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), sometimes the result is the reverse, as in Gallini
(1992), and sometimes the length-breadth mix makes no difference, as in Nordhaus
(1972). As if to summarise, Klemperer (1990) provides examples of all these re-
sults. Fortunately, Denicolò (1996) establishes a general conclusion about the
shape of optimal patent policy, which explains how the seemingly contradictory
findings above are explained by the dissimilar effects of the patent breadth on so-
cial welfare and post-innovation market structure in these models. In the sequel, I
call this general conclusion, i.e. Proposition 1 in Denicolò (1996), Denicolò’s pat-
ent theorem.
Like Denicolò (1996), we can generalise the notion of patent breadth by as-
suming that the inventor’s profit and social welfare are its functions. Let w denote
the width of the patent grant. The innovator’s profit after successful innovation
π(w) then depends on patent breadth so that π(1) = πm and π(0) = π . Similarly,
W(w) denotes static social welfare as a function of patent breadth so that W(1)= Wm
and W(0) = W . The strain caused by the static and dynamic inefficiencies mani-
fests itself in the contrary effects of the patent breadth on social welfare and the
innovator’s profit, i.e. W´(w)<0 and π´(w)>0.
The private and social returns on innovation can now be rewritten as
P(T,w) = e w dt e dtrtT rt
T
− −
∞∫ ∫+π π( )0 (6)
and
S(T,w) = e W w dt e WdtrtT rt
T
− −
∞∫ ∫+( )0 . (7)
In designing the optimal patent, both length and width have usually been chosen so
as to maximise the social utility from existing innovation, constraining the supply
of innovation to a predetermined level. In other words, the social planner’s prob-
lem is to maximise S with respect to T and w, maintaining α as a constant. The
first-order condition for the inventor’s problem is now re-expressed as
( )
α =
P T w
R
,
. (8)
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Let T(w) be the patent length which maintains innovation activity at the required
level defined by equation (8), and let the term T  denote the value of T solving
equation (8) for perfect patent protection w=1. Similarly, w  denotes the value of w
solving equation (8) when T approaches infinity. To keep the subsequent discus-
sion interesting, the minimum values T  and w  are assumed to exist, and to be
positive and finite. Differentiating (8) yields
dT
dw
P
P
w
T
= −  < 0. (9)
According to (8) the policy tools are substitutes with regard to innovation, or as
Nordhaus (1972), p. 430 says it: ‘if breadth is reduced the optimal life must in-
crease to compensate’. The social value of an existing innovation is now S(w,
T(w)). Take the total differential of S(w, T(w)) with respect to w to obtain
dS
dw
P
P
S Sw
T
T w= − + . (10)
Let εik, i∈(P, S), k∈(w, T), measure the elasticity of the private and social values of
innovation in respect of the policy variables. For example, ε Pw
d P
d w
=
ln
ln
.
PROPOSITION 1. The optimal patent policy is determined by the following three
conditions:
 i) If patent length has a relatively large impact on the incentive to innovate, i.e.
− < −
ε
ε
ε
ε
Pw
Sw
PT
ST
 holds, the optimal patent has minimum breadth and maxi-
mum length, i.e. w= w  and T=∞.
 ii) If patent breadth has relatively large impact on the incentive to innovate,
i.e.− > −
ε
ε
ε
ε
Pw
Sw
PT
ST
 holds, the optimal patent has maximum breadth and
minimum length, i.e. w=1 and T=T .
 iii) If the relative impacts of patent breadth and length are equal, i.e.
− = −
ε
ε
ε
ε
Pw
Sw
PT
ST
 holds, social welfare is independent of the combination of
patent breadth and length.
Proof: When (10) is positive, the optimal patent should have maximum breadth and
minimum length. When (10) is negative, the opposite holds. If (10) is equal to
nought, social welfare is independent of the breadth-length mix. It is easy to dem-
onstrate that
 − +
P
P
S Sw
T
T w  =
<
>
 0
equals
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−
<
>
−
ε
ε
ε
ε
Pw
Sw
PT
ST
= .
QED
This outcome is easy to explain. When an increase in patent width curbs post-
innovation social welfare relatively more and accelerates innovative activity rela-
tively less than an increase in patent life, it is desirable to make patents as narrow
as possible by prolonging patent life correspondingly. This leaves the incentive to
innovate unaltered but expands static social welfare. However, if patent width
stimulates investment in innovation relatively more than patent length while re-
ducing the post-innovation welfare relatively less, as short a patent life as possible
is socially optimal.
One should now proceed to show that in Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) it holds that
-ε Pw /ε Sw  < -ε PT /ε ST , and in Gallini (1992) -ε Pw /ε Sw  > -ε PT /ε ST , but this is
an unchallenging exercise, the work having been done by Denicolò (1996), who
demonstrates how the findings in different models such as Tandon (1982), Gilbert
and Shapiro (1990), Klemperer (1990), and Gallini (1992) follow from his theo-
rem. It is thus reasonable to try to establish a link between Proposition 1 and Deni-
colò’s patent theorem. Such a link quickly follows upon the introduction of
D(w)= W -W(w) as the static dead-weight loss assigned to the patent protection,
and I(w)=π(w)-π  as a measure of the relative incentive to innovate.
COROLLARY 1. Denicolò’s patent theorem (Denicolò, 1996). The optimal patent
policy is determined by the following three conditions:
 i) If both static social welfare S(w) and relative incentive to innovate I(w) are
convex in patent breadth, with at least one being strictly so, the optimal pat-
ent has maximum breadth and minimum length, i.e. w=1 and T=T .
 ii) If both S(w) and I(w) are concave in patent breadth, with at least one being
strictly so, the optimal patent has minimum breadth and maximum length,
i.e. w= w  and T=∞.
 iii) If both S and I are linear in patent breadth, social welfare is independent of
the combination of patent breadth and length.
Proof: It is easy to see that −
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>
−
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ε
ε
ε
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Sw
PT
ST
=  is equivalent to −
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>
−
P
S
P
S
w
w
T
T
= . Differ-
entiating (6) and (7), it almost immediately follows that -P
w
/S
w
 is equivalent to
I
w
/D
w
, and -PT/ST is equivalent to I/D. By rearranging (10) and substituting Iw/Dw for
-P
w
/S
w
 and I/D for -PT/ST, one can verify that the sign of dS/dw is determined by the
sign of ψ(w)=I
w
D-D
w
I. The rest goes as in Denicolò (1996). Taking the derivative
of ψ(w) with respect to w yields ψ
w
=I
ww
D-D
ww
I. Clearly, if I
ww
 and S
ww
 are positive,
ψ
w
>0, and if I
ww
 and S
ww
 are negative, ψ
w
<0. Because ψ(0)=0, the sign of ψ
w
 deter-
mines the sign of dS/dw.
QED
To illustrate the findings in Proposition 1 and in Denicolò’s patent theorem, I
briefly consider Nordhaus’s model of the optimal patent life and breadth (see
Nordhaus, 1969, chapter 5, and Nordhaus, 1972), which is an example omitted
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from Denicolò (1996). Though not explicitly shown, it is apparent that the optimal
patent policy in Nordhaus (1972) is independent of the exact combination of the
patent breadth and length. Nordhaus (1969) and (1972) consider a homogenous
good industry with the demand function Q = a-ηp, where p and Q denote price and
output, and η measures the price elasticity of demand. By employing the technol-
ogy in (1) the innovator can now reduce the marginal cost of production c so that
the size of the cost reduction θ is an increasing and concave function of the in-
vestment in invention α. The inventor’s post-invention marginal cost is thus c-
θ(α). The invention is non-drastic, that is, the innovating firm cannot drive its
competitors out of the market. The competitors’ marginal cost in the post-
innovation market equilibrium given by c-(1-w)θ depends on patent width. The
invention is assumed to be licensed to all firms in the industry with a royalty rate
equalling the cost reduction not freely spilling over. The royalty rate is thus θw.
After the patent expires there is free entry, which entirely dilutes the inventor’s
profit, that is,π =0. Normalising the level of output before invention to unity,6 the
return on innovation can be written as
P(T,w) = I(T,w) = e wdtrtT −∫ ε0 . (11)
The static social welfare S is given by
 S = ( )e wdt e w w dt e w dtrtT rt
T
rt− −
∞
−
∞∫ ∫ ∫+ +  + − + ε θ ηθ θ ηθ0
2 2
02
1
2
. (12)
The first integral in equation (12) represents the inventor’s profit when the patent is
in force, the second integral captures the increase in consumer surplus after the
patent expires, and the last depicts the effect of the spillover on consumer surplus.
The brilliance of Denicolò’s patent theorem is its simplicity. From (11) and (12)
the linearity of I and S in w is obvious so that Denicolò’s patent theorem implies
the independence of social welfare from the width-length mix. In resorting to
Proposition 1 we must calculate the elasticities, which is slightly more involved.
Clearly, εPw=1 and εPT=
rTe
e
rT
rT
−
−
−( )1 , and solving for εSw and εST yields
εSw=
( )
−
−
−θ η2 1
2
e w
rS
rT
 and εST=−
−θ η2
2
e wT
S
rT
. There-
fore,
( )
− =
−
= −
−
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ε
θ η ε
ε
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rT
ST
PT
e w
rS
2 1
2
, and by Proposition 1, the policy variable
mix is irrelevant for social welfare.
Whilst Denicolò’s patent theorem is convenient, it fails to predict the optimal
patent design when the second derivatives of functions S(w) and I(w) take the op-
posite signs. In such circumstances one must rely on Proposition 1. An example in
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 Nordhaus (1969, 1972) also normalises the marginal cost before invention to unity. As a result, the
size of the cost reduction θ becomes equivalent to the size of the relative cost reduction B=θ/c. He
then employs B through both his studies. I think, however, this latter normalisation only confuses
the reader.
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which the incentive to innovate is concave but static welfare is convex in patent
width is discussed in the first essay of the dissertation.
In assessing the reliability of the observations here some caveats should be
borne in mind. The incentive to innovate in Denicolò (1996) arises from the equi-
librium of a stochastic patent race, whereas here it is determined by a much simpler
maximisation problem in which the competitive pressure from other innovators is
ignored. As the discussion concerns elasticities, however, adapting more instruc-
tive formulation of innovative activity involves no loss of generality. Another ca-
veat lies in the underlying assumption in deriving Proposition 1 and Corollary 1
that an increase in patent length or width invariably stimulates the incentive to in-
novate and diminishes static social welfare. This assumption covers the most usual
cases, and the model above satisfies it. However, in some special circumstances, as
in Klemperer (1990) and Waterson (1990), S
w
 may be positive, and the signs of the
inequalities in Proposition 1 should be the reverse, because the proof of the propo-
sition requires dividing by S
w
. Changing the signs immediately shows that the op-
timal patent should have maximum breadth and minimum length when S
w 
> 0 – a
heuristic finding indeed.
In sailing between the Scylla and Charybdis of the static and dynamic ineffi-
ciencies, the policy-makers may begin to wonder whether there are better means of
encouraging innovation. As Spence (1984) and Kanniainen and Stenbacka (1997)
argue, the efficient solution to underprovision of innovation is subsidising research,
not creating price distortions through the patent system. Raising funds for subsi-
dies, however, creates distortions of its own, and one may also doubt the ability of
governments to identify what research is worth paying for. As suggested by Wright
(1983), precisely this imbalance of information between researchers and policy-
makers makes patents an attractive incentive mechanism. Nevertheless, nothing
prevents combining patents with subsidies as in Romano (1989) and Kanniainen
and Stenbacka (1997). In general two instruments are better than one. In fact, the
legislation protecting intellectual property includes numerous other policy instru-
ments in addition to patent length and width, which may partly alleviate the tension
between the static and dynamic dimensions of intellectual property protection.
2.2 Copyright and other Instruments of Intellectual
Property Protection
As explained in the previous section, a broad interpretation of patent breadth incor-
porates compulsory licensing. Similarly, a broad interpretation of patent breadth
incorporates the novelty criterion or patentability requirement. Whereas compul-
sory licensing is hardly a necessary section of patent law, the novelty criterion has
general importance. The patentability of an invention requires ‘novelty’ and ‘non-
obviousness’, usually separate requirements in patent law (see e.g. PatL2§), but in
practice they are difficult to distinguish. Many authors thus use the novelty crite-
rion as shorthand for both requirements. While patent breadth determines how dif-
ficult it is to produce a non-infringing substitute for the patented innovation, the
novelty criterion determines how difficult it is to produce a non-infringing im-
provement. Improvements are substitutes, but not necessarily vice versa. If neces-
sary, the distinction between the novelty criterion and patent breadth can clearly be
made and has been made. For instance, Van Dijk (1996) even calls the novelty
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criterion patent height, and O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) distinguish
it as ‘leading breadth’ from ‘lagging breadth’, which protects against imitation.
There has during the past decade been considerable interest in the effects of the
novelty criterion on the cumulative innovation process. Suzanne Scotchmer with
her co-authors has contributed to this issue particularly, see Scotchmer (1991,
1996), Green and Scotchmer (1995), O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998).
Other recent studies on the interplay between cumulative innovation and optimal
patent policy include Cadot and Lippman (1998), Chang (1995), Chou and Shy
(1993), Denicolò (1997, 1998), Horowitz and Lai (1996), and O’Donoghue (1997).
The chief body of this research concentrates on the division of profits between the
first innovation and the subsequent generations. Technological progress is cumula-
tive, and this line of research challenges some views of the basic Nordhausian
framework over one innovation period. For instance, Chou and Shy (1993),
Horowitz and Lai (1996), and Cadot and Lippman (1998) use repeated-innovation
models to demonstrate that long patents retard the introduction of a new product
generation, thus casting doubts over the basic hypothesis that long patent life in-
variably spurs innovation. But my position on this issue exactly corresponds to
Schumpeter’s:
‘Jeder konkrete Entwicklungsvorgang beruch auf vorhergehenden Entwicklungen.
Um aber das Wesen der Sache ganz scharf zu sehen, wollen wir davon abstrahieren
und die Entwicklung sich aus einem entwicklungslosen Zustand erheben lassen.’
(Joseph A. Schumpeter Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, 1911, p. 107)
A more purposeful question in this setting is to investigate the patentability crite-
rion by comparing a traditionally strict patent system to a more permissive system
allowing accidental duplication of innovations, this being the subject of the second
essay of the dissertation. Such a permissive system is practically equivalent to
copyright protection. The distinction between patent and copyright protection is
broadly speaking that a copyright provides much weaker protection, since it merely
protects expression, not ideas. In the prevailing patent system only one patent can
be awarded among potentially several similar but genuine innovations, whereas
copyright law permits independent discoveries.
It has traditionally been thought that the principal policy tool employed to
stimulate innovation is patent protection, but there are now several significant in-
dustries such as education, entertainment, computer software and many Internet
related businesses under copyright protection. There has also been some sign of
reviving interest in the subject in economics. Besen and Kirby (1989) summarise
the previous literature dealing with copying of books and journals, including the
contributions in the influential Journal of Political Economy by Novos and Wald-
man (1984), Johnson (1985), and Liebowitz (1985). Landes and Posner (1989) also
provide a fairly comprehensive basic account of the economics of copyright pro-
tection. Waterson and Ireland (1998) develop an auction model to compare the
welfare effects of the patent and copyright systems. Inspired by the recent debate
on the legal protection of computer software,7 they argue that software should be
protected by means of copyrights. The same debate is also a driving force behind
Shy and Thisse’s (1998) study of copyright protection in the software industry (see
the following subsection for more on their paper).
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 For more on this debate, see, Beresford (1997) for example.
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Landes and Posner (1989) advocate the division between copyright and patent
protection by referring to the difference in works under copyright and patent pro-
tection. Their argument is based on the difficulty of checking all material under
copyright to avoid inadvertent duplication of the originally copyrighted work. By
contrast, an inventor can avoid infringement of an existing patent, because an in-
vention can be both described accurately and indexed by the Patent Office. This
argument may be justified in some circumstances, but is dubious in many others.
Taking scientific research as an example, it is arguably feasible to avoid duplica-
tion of published research findings.
Nonetheless, even if Landes and Posner’s (1989) claim were valid and it was
not desirable to tighten the novelty and non-obviousness criterion in copyright law,
there are various ways in which the novelty criterion in patent law could be re-
formed to allow inadvertent duplication of innovation. In fact, La Manna, Mac-
Leod and de Meza (1989) (see also La Manna, 1994, 1995) suggest a permissive
patent system allowing accidental infringements of patents and even find this per-
missive system welfare superior to a traditionally strict patent system under a wide
range of circumstances. Their proposal to relax the novelty criterion is based on the
real-world lag between receiving an application and granting the patent. This lag
would enable the Patent Office to award the patent to all applications received up
to the grant of the first patent. Such a modification of the legislation would be rela-
tively easy to achieve, since patent applications are already secret 18 months after
filing in many countries.
For modelling purposes, the concept of the patentability criterion raises the
same difficulty as the concept of patent breadth – it is hopelessly abstract. In con-
trast, the concept of a renewal fee is as clear-cut as the concept of patent duration.
Currently most patent systems require that patentees pay annual renewal fees in
order to maintain their patents in force up to a statutory patent life. Lanjouw, Pakes
and Putnam (1998) survey empirical studies of patent renewal data, including
Pakes (1986), Schankerman and Pakes (1986) and Lanjouw (1998), demonstrating
how patentees optimise to maintain patent protection. While the fees are usually
quite moderate, most patents are voluntarily cancelled. For example, after investi-
gating the patent renewal data from France, Germany, and the UK, Schankerman
and Pakes (1986) report that only 10% of patents remain in force for their full
statutory life.
Several factors may underlie the decision to discard the annual renewal fee, but
the primary reasons seem to be technological progress rendering the innovations
obsolescent, and unfavourable realisation of demand uncertainty. For example, un-
der demand uncertainty an innovator may initially patent a product and wait until
the uncertainty resolves itself. The level of demand may prove to be insufficient to
justify commercialisation, and the innovator reasonably refuses to renew the pat-
ent. Patents can thus be seen as options to wait. The third essay of the dissertation
builds upon this view.
Because renewal fees in practice make the patent protection term invention-
specific, they can improve welfare, as shown in Cornelli and Pakes (1996) and
Scotchmer (1998). Ignoring the implementation costs, it should be no surprise that
the introduction of an additional policy instrument is welfare-enhancing in princi-
ple, as the policy-makers can use the instrument only in favourable circumstances,
and abstain from actual use otherwise. Remarkably, Scotchmer (1998) proves that
these favourable circumstances are relatively restricted, advocating a patent system
of no renewal fees.
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2.3 The Decision to Seek the Legal Protection of
Intellectual Property
A patent is by no means the only means to protect research findings in industrial
organisations. The patent is not even the most important instrument of protection.
Several empirical studies, including Harabi (1995), Mansfield (1986), Levin, Kle-
vorick, Nelson and Winter (1987), Veugelers (1998), and Arundel and Kabla
(1998) demonstrate how the percentage of patented innovations varies by industry
because of the differences in the ability of patents to prevent imitation, suggesting
that secrecy, lead-time, learning advantages and sales and service efforts often pro-
vide better protection than patents. Anecdotal evidence is also easy to find: Jorma
Ylikauppila, Valmet’s deputy manager, recently mentioned that Valmet, the
world’s leading manufacturer of paper and board machines, resorts to secrecy with
regard to process innovations, and Esko Friman, Nokia Telecommunications’s in-
tellectual property rights manager, reports that Nokia seeks patent protection only
if an innovation cannot be kept secret (Tekniikka & Talous 2.4.1998). There is also
a significant research tradition, beginning with Nelson (1959) and Ruff (1969),
asserting that research joint ventures are established in order to improve the man-
agement of knowledge spillovers.
Patents are often still applied for, being necessary to enforce intellectual prop-
erty. Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997) estimate that a patent may generate more
than one suit in the US for every hundred patents.8 While enforcement costs, as
Lanjouw and Schankerman (1998) demonstrate, may seriously undermine the in-
centive to invest in R&D, the damages for infringements establish a solid ground
for the status of a patent as property. This status is further justified because patents
facilitate the sales of technologies. Patents are thus usually employed as an addi-
tional means of protection against potential infringement cases and technology
transfer; quite sensibly, because in practice mere secrecy is at odds with patents as
a protection device. There is rarely an opportunity to choose, say, between patents
and copyrights. Accordingly, having succeeded in innovative activity, the innova-
tor encounters the problem of whether to publish the research results and apply for
patent protection instead of trusting to secrecy.9
The innovator’s option of keeping the innovation secret may lead us astray in
using the number of patents as an index of technological progress. For instance,
Griliches’s survey (1990) demonstrates that the number of patent applications has
been fairly constant for many decades despite tremendous growth in innovative
endeavours.10 Griliches (1990) asks, whether are patents shrinking yardsticks, or
whether this phenomenon suggests that our ‘stock of knowledge’ is going to be
exhausted? There are several possible explanations, but Schmookler's (1966) old
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 Lanjouw and Lerner (1997) provide a survey of recent empirical literature on patent litigation.
Such litigation has also recently been incorporated into theoretical models (e.g. Meurer, 1989, Wa-
terson, 1990, and Choi, 1996). Except for the case study, this dissertation retains a strict ‘fence-post’
system, i.e. the interpretation of patent scope is assumed to be exact.
9
 As careful readers no doubt have already noticed, protection by secrecy is also partially enforced
by law. Trusting secrecy also involves trusting trade secret laws. For some economics of trade secret
law, see Friedman, Landes and Posner (1991).
10
 The time span covered by Griliches’s (1990) survey excludes the sharp increase in the applica-
tions in the US in late 80s and early 90s. See Kortum and Lerner (1997) for a detailed investigation
of this interesting observation.
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hypothesis that there has been an increasing disparity between patenting and the
actual pace of innovation in this century is plausible.
This puzzle over patent statistics has long worried the empirical economists,
and to some extent the theorists. Not surprisingly, the theoretical discussion on the
decision to patent, as in Horstman, MacDonald and Slivinski (1985), Scotchmer
and Green (1990), Gallini (1992) and Van Dijk (1996), mainly focuses on the stra-
tegic aspects of information disclosure in patent files.
Only Saarenheimo (1994) seems to stress the empirical considerations in rigor-
ously explaining Schmookler’s (1966) old observation of proportionally less patent
applications filed by larger companies than by smaller ones. The explanation is
also quite natural. Small firms prefer to patent and license intermediate innovations
rather than keep them secret and to try and win the whole innovation race, as their
probability of doing so is small. The finding in Schmookler (1966) and Saaren-
heimo (1994) is actually a corollary of another old finding, first established by
Mansfield (1963), on the inverse relation between the length of time that a firm
waits before introducing an innovation and the size of the firm. The reason is
probably that small firms have less resources for completing the entire innovation
projects, as emphasised in Williamson (1975). However, the latest research results
reported by Arundel and Kabla (1998) thoroughly invalidate this conclusion. Hav-
ing surveyed the decision to patent of over 600 European companies, they show
that the propensity to patent markedly increases with firm size. Merely to see that
more research is warranted to settle the matter, it is perhaps superfluous to add that
both Saarenheimo (1994) and Arundel and Kabla (1998) provide references to
other empirical work supporting their conclusions.11
The relative ignorance of the empirical considerations in the theoretical litera-
ture is regrettable, since should the theorists turn toward empirical issues, they
might provide substantial insights. Take the ‘demand-pull’ hypothesis of techno-
logical change for example. Patent statistics are often employed to support this hy-
pothesis. For instance, widely cited studies by Schmookler (1966) and Sokoleff
(1988) stress market size as a main stimulant of innovation on the evidence of pat-
ent records. The rewards from inventive activity may well increase with market
size, but so may the rewards from patenting as shown in Takalo (1996).12 The evi-
dence in Grupp and Schmoch (1996) indicates that market size assists in elucidat-
ing the patenting strategies of multinational telecommunication companies for the
1987-89 period. For instance, the number of patent applications by the Japanese
companies in Sweden were approximately one fifth of the corresponding number in
the US. Similarly, Arundel and Kabla (1998) invoke market size in explaining the
observed difference in the propensity to patent between Europe and the US.
The decision on how to utilise copyright protection in the software industry is
evaluated in an intriguing recent paper by Shy and Thisse (1998), who find that it
may be beneficial for competing firms not to use copyright protection in the pres-
ence of significant network externalities to promote their sales. They also provide
evidence to support such a decline in firms’ willingness to protect their software
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 Interestingly, Arundel and Kabla (1998, p.139) consider their finding ‘not intuitively obvious’ for
the very same reason entailing Saarenheimo’s (1994) contrary prediction or, as Arundel and Kabla
(1998, p.139) put it, ‘...smaller firms may need to sell or license their process innovations in order to
recoup the development costs.’
12
 The first essay is a condensed version of this enlarged working paper. The earlier version also in-
cludes a formal discussion of how market size affects patenting behaviour.
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innovations. Similar reasoning can immediately be extended to patent protection.
Hultén (1996) describes how the standard for the Nordic mobile telephone system
(NMT) was left unpatented in order to accelerate its adoption.
Finally, let us examine the decision to patent (or to apply for copyright protec-
tion) in more detail. The enthusiastic advocates of the legal protection of intellec-
tual property such as Kitch (1986), Dam (1994) and Thurow (1997) sometimes
assert that patents provide little if any monopoly power, or that secrecy is much
more detrimental to social welfare than any monopoly position authorised by in-
tellectual property laws. It is easy to burst this bubble. Innovations are patented
only if patenting is more profitable than secrecy, that is, the condition for patent-
ing, ignoring patenting costs, is
e dt e w dt e dtrt
L
rt
L
T
rt
T
− − −
∞∫ ∫ ∫+ +π π π( ) ( ) ( )1 00 > e dt e dtrtS rtS− −∞∫ ∫+π π( ) ( )1 00 ,   (13)
in which L depicts the lead time when the innovation is patented, S is the length of
time the innovation is managed to kept secret, and T is patent length as before. The
decision to patent is interesting only if L<S<T. The first integral on the left-hand
side of (13) thus depicts the monopoly profits when the innovation is patented but
no rival introduction has occurred. The second integral reflects the profits during
patent protection when at least one rival has appeared in the market, and the third
the profits after the patent expires. The first term on the right-hand side captures
the monopoly profits as long as the innovation can be kept completely secret. Once
a competitor succeeds in reverse engineering the new product or process containing
the innovation, there is no additional protection available by law. The profits after
losing the competitive advantage created by secrecy are represented by the last
term of equation (13). For brevity, these profits are assumed to be equivalent to the
profits after the patent expires, even though it is possible that the situation after the
patent expires is worse from the innovator’s point of view, because the patent files
contain technical information about the innovation. Even without recourse to this
information-disclosure effect, the argument that patent protection must afford mo-
nopoly power is easily shown. After simplifying, patenting condition (13) can be
rewritten as
( ) ( ) ( )e e w e e e erL rT rL rS rS rT− − − − − −− > − + −π π π( ) ( ) ( )1 0 .
Now patent width w can clearly be interpreted as a measure of the degree of mo-
nopoly power. If patents confer no such power, i.e. π(w) ≈ π(0), we immediately
see that there is no reason to patent. Of course, at some level it is a matter of se-
mantics whether one ascribes the advantage over competitors obtained through
patenting to monopoly or ‘economic rent’ as in Kitch (1986) and Dam (1994). But
one simply cannot consistently advocate the patent system while at the same time
entirely denying its static inefficiency.
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3 The Subject Matter of the Thesis
To summarise some essential aspects of the previous section and to provide a set-
ting for the subsequent discussion in this section, let us first outline an innovation
project. The initial research investment is usually preceded by the organisational
design of the project. For instance, whether to engage in a research joint venture or
to invest in one’s own research laboratory should be decided. It is even possible to
commit oneself to both. The actual research phase follows the project launch. Suc-
cessful research yields an invention, but an invention as such is seldom immedi-
ately suited to profitable use; the development phase succeeds the research. As-
suming that the invention satisfies the requirements of patent law rather than, say,
copyright law, the innovating firm holds the option of patenting the invention.
Neither the decision to patent nor the decision to utilise the innovation is trivial
because both patenting and the introduction of the innovation involve considerable
sunk costs, and the cash begins to flow only after the market introduction. Besides,
the cash flow is uncertain, depending heavily on the demand growth and the speed
of imitation. Finally, if the invention is patented, it may be licensed irrespective of
the commercialisation decision. The sequence of events is represented in Figure 1.
Figure 1. The sequence of events in an innovation project.
This description of an R&D project is admittedly simplified, but the details will be
spelt out in the four essays of this dissertation. Even this outline is, however, help-
ful in comprehending the determination of knowledge spillovers and the nature of
intellectual property protection for society as a whole. A spillover has only two
origins. First, the level of the spillover is in part a result of the institutional struc-
ture protecting intellectual property. Such institutions shape R&D projects, as if
they provided the frames for Figure 1. The institutions also crucially affect the
timing of events. For instance, the patenting option of product innovations is alive
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only during the development phase, as one cannot patent an invention that has al-
ready been commercialised.
Secondly, the decisions involved at each stage of the project have an impact on
the level of knowledge spillover, as noted in the literature. Katz (1986), Severinov
(1997), Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) are examples of papers exploring the impact
of organisational design, Cohen and Levinthal (1989), and Kamien and Zang
(1998) study the impact of the investments made at stage 1, the impact of the pat-
ent decision was briefly evaluated in section 2.3 above, and the role of the licens-
ing decision or the information-exchange is investigated in Katsoulacos and Ulph
(1998) as well as briefly in the fourth essay. The market introduction clearly has
the major impact, as it ultimately enables the diffusion of new technology through
imitation. Of course, investment in imitation can be carried out at other stages of an
R&D project; the decision to specialise in imitation is often made either at the out-
set, or upon failing to succeed in research investment, but perhaps the key advan-
tage of imitation is that imitative products or processes can be introduced only after
the market uncertainty has resolved. Only successful innovations are imitated. De-
termination of the spillover through such a rational investment in imitation elabo-
rated in the first essay and Kanniainen and Stenbacka (1997).
As the previous section demonstrated, there has been considerable progress in
our understanding of the economics of intellectual property protection in the past
thirty years, especially regarding patent protection. Despite the progress made in
previous research, some patent defects still persist in the literature. The aim of this
dissertation is partly to fill these gaps. In particular, the essays recognise the multi-
stage character of R&D projects, as depicted in Figure 1, and concern the policy of
protecting intellectual property in this light. Most preceding literature has treated
the decisions to patent and commercialise rather casually. The development of the
post-innovation market structure has also often been described relatively mechani-
cally. Taken together this has resulted in a research view which considers the
knowledge spillovers as an automatic and costless consequence of innovative ac-
tivity.
A primary concern of this thesis is to advance the theory of intellectual property
protection by modelling the spillover process explicitly. Figure 1 illustrates how
the decisions in each phase of innovation projects are matters of optimisation for
innovators, who also have various means of affecting the post-innovation market
structure. The imitator’s decisions apparently also have a significant effect on the
spillovers. Beside endogenising the R&D spillovers, new insights can be gained by
taking account the impact of policy variables at different stages of R&D projects.
Each of the four essays utilises a quite different methodology. The first essay
considers optimal patent policy when the innovator has the option of keeping the
innovation secret. The analysis is conducted under the usual partial equilibrium
assumptions. In the second essay, optimal patent policy is addressed in a general
equilibrium environment by adopting a well-specified search model. The notion of
a patent as an option to wait for market introduction is formalised in the third es-
say, which has been jointly written with Vesa Kanniainen. This essay is based on
the theory of real options. While the three first essays subsist in the imaginary
world of economic models, a detailed inquiry into a real-world innovation project
involving all stages of Figure 1 is made in the last essay, jointly written with Klaus
Kultti. In tying this case to the theory of incomplete contracts, we evaluate whether
some events in the project are relevant beyond our particular focus and specifica-
tion.
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3.1 Innovation and Imitation under Imperfect Patent
Protection
The diffusion of newly invented technologies, which has been explored by a num-
ber of economists, including influential contributions by Reinganum (1981b),
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), and Stenbacka and Tombak (1994), contributes to
our well-being. The discussion, however, focuses on the strategic aspects of
adapting new technology, omitting the role of patents from the analysis. The re-
search tradition in the literature of optimal patent design in turn considers diffusion
trivial. With the exceptions of Gallini (1992) and Kanniainen and Stenbacka
(1997), the imitation of patented products is either prohibitively costly or com-
pletely costless. Considering the tremendous research effort on R&D spillovers (for
a survey, see De Bondt ,1996), this is really surprising, as the results of research
and development activities performed by one firm can seldom be used by others as
well. While the determination of spillovers is also discussed in other essays, the
dangers in adhering to exogenous spillovers are explained most clearly in the first
essay.
The first attempts to endogenise spillovers were made by Katz (1986) and
Cohen and Levinthal (1989), but Kanniainen and Stenbacka (1997) are the first to
introduce the idea of determining the spillover through rational investment in imi-
tation.13 In the first essay I draw on their framework to construct a simple model
where spillovers are a consequence of a follower's investment in imitation. In ad-
dition to Kanniainen and Stenbacka (1997), the analysis also incorporates the es-
sential insights from Gallini (1992), where patent breadth raises the imitation costs
and the innovator can choose whether to patent the innovation or keep it secret. She
imposes the restriction that the imitators can invent around the patent at a fixed
cost, whereas the unpatented innovation becomes freely available to everyone.
Extending the analysis in Gallini (1992), I introduce rational imitation where the
outcome is uncertain regardless of the innovator’s decision to patent the innovation
or to keep it secret.
It has usually been thought that an increase in patent length merely increases the
length of the innovator’s monopoly, as in the model in section 2.1. Modelling the
spillover process explicitly, however, demonstrates that the increase in patent
length also boosts investment in imitation, because the imitator can no longer af-
ford simply to ‘wait and see’ until the patent expires. It is crucial from the innova-
tor’s point of view whether the expected spillover is ‘large’ or ‘small’. An increase
in patent length enhances the incentive to innovate only if the degree of spillover is
less than one-half.
Denicolò’s patent theorem, depicted in Corollary 1 in section 2.1, predicts the
optimality of maximum breadth and minimum length when both the incentive to
innovate and post-innovation social welfare are convex in patent breadth, and the
reverse if both are concave. It is silent about the optimal policy when, say, post-
innovation social welfare is convex and the incentive to innovate is concave in pat-
ent breadth. This is precisely the case in the model. One must therefore study the
relative impact of patent width on static social welfare and the incentive to inno-
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 Related studies include Jovanovic and Rob (1989), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) and David-
son and Segerstrom (1998). Jovanovic and his co-authors construct search models and Davidson and
Segerstrom an endogenous-growth model to access the knowledge of others through imitative in-
vestments, but these studies remain relatively abstract in treating the rate of spillover.
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vate, as in Proposition 1. In consequence, the main finding in Gallini (1992) about
the social optimality of short patents is confirmed, but the optimal patent does not
need to be broad if the spillovers are high enough.
Finally, the essay highlights the importance of allowing innovators to choose
between patenting and secrecy as a protection device. It turns out that the innova-
tor’s secrecy option can seriously constrain the scope of efficient patent policy,
because a patent policy matters only if it reduces the rate of spillover.
3.2 Intellectual Property Protection in Search
Equilibrium
The evaluation of policy to protect intellectual property is often conducted in iso-
lation from the rest of the economy. This is satisfactory in so far as there are no
feedback effects from policy variables on the underlying supply and demand func-
tions of innovation specified in advance. Eluding such feedback effects, econo-
mists are keen to conclude that the rate of the spillover deteriorates with stronger
protection, but one would expect the enhanced protection to accelerate investments
in invention, which tend to expand spillovers in the economy. A general equilib-
rium framework would thus certainly have many advantages in studying the legal
protection of intellectual property
A seminal attempt to address optimal patent policy in a dynamic setting incor-
porating the economy-wide effects of the policy has been made by Judd (1985).
Focusing exclusively on patent life and product patents he finds the optimality of
infinite patent life where the representative consumer has the CES-utility function.
As in the other notable studies of product patents by Klemperer (1990) and Water-
son (1990), the patent system may provide society with the right range of products.
Judd’s (1985) model, however, regards invention as a deterministic activity and
patent protection as perfect.
The analysis in the second essay builds loosely on a search model by Lu and
McAfee (1996). The intention is to develop a general equilibrium model in which
agents search for new ideas, and imitation of patented ideas is possible. Lu and
McAfee (1996) are interested in a quite different question, the relative performance
of the trading institutions, but their model has many attractive properties and has a
wider range of applications. In particular, the matchings are not restricted to be
pairwise, and, as shown in Kultti (1998), the matching technology exhibits constant
returns to scale. In the context of the model developed in this essay, matching oc-
curs when an agent discovers an idea. The model thus permits multiple independ-
ent discoveries simultaneously, and because of the constant returns to scale, only
the ratio of agents to ideas matters. As the independent discovery is possible in the
model, it is particularly convenient in comparing the welfare effects of the patent
and copyright protection.
Besides Lu and McAfee (1996), the model has some similarities with Jovanovic
and Rob (1989) and Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) who construct search-
models with endogenous knowledge spillovers to isolate the relationship between
inequality and growth. As in their papers, the incentives to innovate and imitate are
in this essay determined by the model. In the study of innovation, this essay is the
first to derive the discovery probability explicitly. More specifically, the model
provides an explanation of the Poisson discovery rate characterising the patent race
literature and isolates its determinants.
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The welfare effects of copyright and patent protection have previously been
compared by Waterson (1990) and Waterson and Ireland (1998). The closest paper
to this essay, however, is La Manna, MacLeod and de Meza (1989), even though
they explicitly evaluate only a permissive patent system instead of copyright pro-
tection, but their permissive system allowing multiple independent discoveries has
many characteristics of copyright protection. They find that the permissive regime
is less profitable for innovators and requires longer patents by way of compensa-
tion than the strict regime, but the dead-weight loss created by longer patents is
more than offset by the increased consumer surplus in the permissive regime.
The incentives to innovate and imitate are explicitly determined in the model of
this essay. In equilibrium, the permissive regime is actually more attractive for in-
novators, but the development of multiple simultaneous innovations consumes
more resources. There is nothing special in the contrast with La Manna, MacLeod
and de Meza (1989) since if the general equilibrium approach did not change any
predictions of partial equilibrium analysis it would be of limited importance. The
key insight of this essay is that the relative welfare performance of copyright and
patent protection is determined by the difference in the spillovers between innova-
tive and imitative activity. The patent system creates greater welfare when speciali-
sation in imitation yields an efficient capacity to absorb the knowledge spillovers,
but is unable to match the performance of copyright protection when an investment
in innovation renders learning from the others inexpensive.
In addition to comparing the intellectual property rights, the model re-examines
the much-debated issue of the optimal patent length-breadth mix (cf. section 2.1).
With more than simply one policy instrument, the optimal design of the patent
policy has normally been solved by maximising the social utility from existing in-
novations in respect of the instruments, constraining the incentive to innovate to a
predetermined level. In the set-up suggested here, the policy instruments are the
patent length and breadth as usual. The incentive to innovate is no longer prede-
termined but is part of equilibrium in the economy. In the model the agents are free
to choose whether they are searching as innovators or waiting as imitators, and
they can also choose whether to patent the invention or resort to secrecy as an in-
strument of protection. These choices establish the level of the spillover.
One conclusion offers support for the optimality of short patent life. As against
other studies with the same view, such as Gallini (1992) and the first essay, this
finding emerges even with costless imitation. Endogenising the incentive to inno-
vate, however, involves the predictions here being incompatible with Proposition 1
and Denicolò’s patent theorem. The conclusion cannot therefore be attributed to
the functional forms of post-innovation social welfare and the incentive to inno-
vate, but can be explained by a new feed-back effect alleviating the static ineffi-
ciency assigned to strong patent protection, since this increases innovative activity,
expanding the spillovers. It is also shown that the optimal patent should be broader
but shorter when the invention cost increases. In view of Galbraith’s (1952) famous
suggestion of the increasing difficulty of inventing, this leads to a specific policy
recommendation.14
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 See Kortum (1997) for a rigorous treatment of Galbraith’s hypothesis in the context of a search
model.
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3.3 Do Patents Slow Technological Progress?
The impact of patents on innovative activity is far more wide-ranging than the ar-
chetypical Nordhausian framework is able to depict. Patenting rarely involves an
immediate monopoly, because innovators usually apply for patents at an early
stage in the innovation process, a stage in which a considerable uncertainty about
the profitability of adaptation of the patented idea still exists. Early patenting partly
arises from the patent laws, which grant a patent by the first-to-file rule, but the
uncertainty surrounding the commercialisation of new technologies is undeniably a
major source.
A patent seems thus to satisfy the basic definition of a call option as a right but
not an obligation to buy an underlying asset whose price is subject to random
variation. Now ‘to buy an underlying asset whose price is subject to random varia-
tion’ means ‘to introduce an innovation into the market when its benefits are un-
certain’. It should be kept in mind that such an interpretation applies not only to
new products but to new processes. In the context of process innovation, the ques-
tion is about bringing an innovation into use instead of market introduction. A pat-
ent is thus the option of waiting to see how the expected value of the patented idea
will evolve. Only if the prospects are good enough is the option is exercised, and
the decision to commercialise the patented idea made. Such non-financial options
have become known as real options.15 When investment decisions are made under
uncertainty, a real option is valuable because it allows investors to learn about the
underlying stochastic process before committing themselves to a irreversible in-
vestment. After studying the patent renewal data, Pakes (1986) and Lanjouw
(1998) report that the option value of patents is initially high but then declines
rapidly, much of the uncertainty resolving itself in the five years after patenting.
If a patent can be regarded as a real option, common wisdom in the theory that
strong patent protection accelerates market introduction of new technologies
should be reviewed. A good example of this wisdom can be found in Matutes, Re-
gibeau and Rockett (1996). Crucially, their approach abstracts from the uncertainty
about the success of commercialisation of innovation. By contrast, our model in-
corporates the uncertainty and formalises the notion of a patent as the option of
waiting. We show that expanding the scope of patent protection may lead to de-
laying market introduction of new technologies. We maintain that such delay is a
relatively common phenomenon.16
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 There are two comprehensive treatments of the real-option theory: Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and
Trigeorgis (1996). Furthermore, as is usually the case, when a new economic theory with strong im-
plications for corporate management is developed, some excellent, short, and non-technical over-
views appear in Harvard Business Review. See, for example, Dixit and Pindyck (1995), and
Luehrman (1998a, 1998b).
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 Our view is grounded on some anecdotal evidence from earlier literature and our own interviews
with industry practitioners. Some of this evidence is reported here. It is unfortunate that no large-
sample study evaluating the pertinence of our prediction exists. The queries by Mansfield, Schwartz
and Wagner (1981), and Mansfield (1986) provide some indirect evidence in establishing that, ex-
cluding the pharmaceutical industry, less than 30 percent of patented innovations would not have
been commercialised if no patent protection had been available. Furthermore, Mansfield (1986,
p.273) reports that he failed to prove the common wisdom: ‘Of course, there is also question about
timing. Under some circumstances, an invention might developed or commercially introduced more
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Another finding of this essay has implications for the real-option theory gener-
ally. The theory predicts that when an investor holds multiple options over the
same underlying asset, they all should be exercised simultaneously (for details, see
chapter 10 in Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). In other words, sequential investment
never occurs in theory. This prediction accords badly with experience of every-day
life. The major projects of firms and in human life are typically undertaken in
steps. Between the steps we operate under uncertainty in committing ourselves to a
irreversible investment to move into the next stage. According to the theory, how-
ever, the threshold values of consecutive investments decline over time, and if a
project is ever launched, it should be completed as quickly as possible.
The defect of the theory is simply its failure to consider the possibility that an
investment may alter the underlying stochastic process. We demonstrate simply
that if there is a risk of substantial change in the stochastic process, the investments
should be made sequentially. Our analysis is carried out in the context of an R&D
project, but the finding is applicable more generally. It is characteristic of the criti-
cal decisions in life that they may fundamentally change the directions and guide-
lines of future actions. For instance, dating, moving in together, and marriage
deeply influence our lives and the underlying relation, and it may thus be optimal
to wait before moving from one stage to another. Indeed,
‘Of all the reasons for the failure of able men the most important is the inability to
wait.’
Joseph A. Schumpeter. (Richard Swedberg Aphorisms from Schumpeter’s Private
Diary, 1991, p. 206)
3.4 Incomplete Contracting in a Research Joint
Venture: the Micronas Case
In industrial economics, case studies can provide useful insights in constructing
new theories and evaluating old ones when it is impossible to obtain sufficient data
for econometric testing. Incomplete contracting is regarded as a normal feature of
real-life business relationships. There is plenty of theoretical work on the implica-
tions of less than perfect contracts, one of the main interests being the hold-up
problem (see, e.g. Williamson, 1975, and Hart, 1995). Systematic empirical evi-
dence, however, is scant, because contracts between firms are often classified as
business secrets, and are hence difficult to obtain for research purposes. In this
study we employ the extensive information from the life of a Finnish research joint
venture, Micronas, to provide examples of the consequences of incomplete con-
tracts. Of particular interest is the contract governing the licensing of a patent from
a foreign source.
In 1980 three Finnish companies Nokia, Aspo, and Salora established a research
joint venture called Micronas in order to develop and manufacture semiconduc-
tors.17 Underlying the project was the transition in the semiconductor industry. Un-
                                                                                                                                      
slowly or later if the firm could not obtain patent protection. However, according to the firms in the
interviews, this is not an important caveat.’
17
 The name ‘Micronas’ comes from the word ‘Micro’ and the initials from the names of the founder
companies.
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til the late 70s semiconductors were relatively homogenous products that were
available from numerous manufacturers. In the late 70s it became evident that in
future semiconductors must be application-specific. In other words, the degree of
product differentiation was increasing. As against other countries with a significant
electronics industry, Finland had no semiconductor business of its own, which wor-
ried both the venture partners and technology policy-makers. The firms did not
consider it desirable to rely wholly on foreign and outside suppliers; the view was
held across the world that semiconductor manufacturing would be integrated so
that companies in the electronics industry would make their own semiconductors.
The initial technology was bought and transferred from a Californian company,
Micro Power Systems (MPSI), which was selected amongst nearly twenty tenders.
The contract with Micro Power Systems was detailed and complicated, including
ownership arrangements. Even so, co-operation with Micro Power Systems ran
into difficulties because of disagreements about the interpretation of the contract.
The research joint venture also encountered various other troubles, and as a conse-
quence its ownership structure changed several times. Both as a joint venture and
Nokia’s subsidiary Micronas was never profitable. Finally, after years of dismal
economic performance, it was sold to an outside party in 1992, who rapidly ren-
dered it economically viable, and by 1994 net profits were considerable.
The difficulties associated with the initial patent licensing and the research joint
venture would not have occurred in a world of complete contracts. This fairly triv-
ial observation has inspired our study of the contracts and the related problems
from an incomplete contracting point of view. We show that some of the major
events leading to the sale of Micronas to the outside party in 1992 can be seen to
have originated from the hold-up problems. As to the licensing of the patent, theory
suggests two relevant problems. Standard licensing literature highlights asymmet-
ric information about the quality of the technology, and incomplete contract theory
focuses on the hold-up problem where investment costs have been sunk when the
parties bargain over the proceeds of the project. A careful study of the agreement
and the actual licensing process indicates that both hold-up problems and asymmet-
ric information were present, but that hold-up problems were a more serious threat
in this case.
As a corollary we elaborate the theory of patent licensing. The prevailing view
in the licensing literature, e.g. Gallini and Wright (1990), Macho-Stadler and
Pérez-Castrillo (1991), Begg (1992) and Wright (1993), is that the extensive use of
royalties in licensing contracts is a response to pervasive asymmetric information
about the quality of technology. More recently, an alternative argument has been
advanced. Macho-Stadler, Martinez-Giralt, and Pérez-Castrillo (1996) and Jensen
and Thursby (1998) suggest that an output-based payment is necessary to solve a
moral hazard problem if the technology transfer involves active participation by the
licensor. Such a moral hazard problem is practically equivalent to our hold-up
problem. We feel that these explanations of output royalty are to some extent un-
satisfactory, because there is a simpler contract form solving the problem of private
information as well as the hold-up problem than the output royalty. This is shown
formally in the essay. Our solution is a version of the option-to-own contracts in
Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995) and (1997). The basic idea behind such a contact is
simple: the seller holds the right but not the obligation to complete the delivery,
and the payment of the buyer is contingent on the delivery decision of the seller.
We also consider some other issues including the formation of the research joint
venture. Theory suggests several reasons to establish a research joint venture, such
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as internalisation of the externality created by R&D spillovers, cost or risk-sharing,
avoidance of research duplication, the final output cartel, and technological and
product market complementarities. From the seminal papers by Nelson (1959) and
Ruff (1969) to a recent contribution by Leahy and Neary (1997), the bulk of theo-
retical literature highlights the internalisation of spillovers as the principal reason,
but there seems now to be significant evidence that this hypothesis should be re-
jected (see e.g. Röller, Tombak and Siebert, 1997, Hamel, Doz and Prahalad,
1989). We provide one addition to this evidence of rejection. In our case, cost
sharing, avoiding duplication and complementarities in technology and product
market seemed to be the chief reasons to set up the research joint venture.
Finally, we show how R&D spillovers can be endogenised in the sense that
even without spillovers firms always have an incentive to exchange the R&D in-
formation when the investment costs have been sunk. This may to some extent ex-
plain patent pooling and ex-post cross-licensing. We first demonstrate how the
spillover parameter in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin’s celebrated model (1988) can
be explained as the outcome of a simple information-exchange game, and we then
offer a real information-exchange agreement between Micronas and Micro Power
Systems as an example. Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) have also recently resorted to
the information-exchange in modelling endogenous R&D spillovers, but their
framework is much richer, incorporating the impact of organisational design on the
degree of the spillover as well.
4 Concluding Remarks
Intellectual property lies at the heart of a modern economy. The performance of the
institutional structure protecting this property is a matter of deep concern in deter-
mining future economic well-being. These observations have inspired this work on
the economics of intellectual property protection. The core of the work consists of
the four following essays, each of which adopts a quite different framework. To
derive policy recommendations is thus a delicate task. Nevertheless, to be pro-
vocative, I draw attention to three findings which seem to survive different ap-
proaches. These findings are taken in turn in the following subsection. To finish
this introductory essay, the pertinent challenges to future research are briefly re-
viewed in section 4.2.
4.1 Three Implications for Technology Policy
Perhaps the key lesson from this dissertation is that in researching intellectual
property protection, one should pay careful attention to the determination of
knowledge spillovers. Most new insights in the essays of this dissertation stem
from explicit modelling of these spillovers. Given the versatility of the methodo-
logical framework of the essays, it is extraordinary to discover that some conclu-
sions are unrestricted to the particular framework but emerge from different
sources. The first conclusion is almost self-evident but fundamental:
i) Patenting reduces the spillover rate.
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Despite the substantial insights gained from previous research, there seems to be
considerable confusion surrounding the issue of information disclosure in patent-
ing. One of the chief arguments put in favour of the patent system is that it pro-
vides public access to research information, as one can see, for instance, in
Scotchmer and Green (1990), Ordover (1991), Mansfield (1993), Dam (1994),
Dnes (1996), and Thurow (1997). As already noted in Penrose (1951), and rigor-
ously proved in the first three essays of this dissertation, however, this argument
for the patent system is very weak, since patenting is useful for the innovator only
in efficiently retarding the dissemination of research findings. A concession to the
supporters of the public-access rationale can, however, be made. Because the inno-
vator might ignore information flow to other industries in making the decision to
patent, a logical possibility still exists that such disregarded information disclosure
is sufficient to invalidate this conclusion.
The second implication is in part a corollary to the first:
ii) The prospects for a welfare-improving patent policy are restricted.
Because a patent policy matters only if it reduces the rate of spillover, the innova-
tor’s option of keeping the innovation secret can constrain the scope of efficient
patent policy. It is shown in the first essay that if the competition at the product
market stage between the innovating and imitating firms is fierce, the patent system
can hardly increase welfare. Furthermore, the innovator’s option of keeping the
innovation secret turns out to be relatively insignificant in the second essay, be-
cause there is another, even more stringent constraint on the policy. Patent protec-
tion, and to some extent copyright protection, should be employed to stimulate in-
novation only when the appropriability problems are pervasive and the elasticity of
the innovator’s productivity with respect to the share of resources devoted to inno-
vation is low. The root of the problem with extensive protection, that even with no
policy intervention market equilibrium may generate too much duplication of re-
search investments, has been known at least since Barzel (1968).
The last policy implication is somewhat more tentative:
iii) Optimal patent life is short.
This conclusion is based on several distinct reasons. The first essay verifies that the
finding in Gallini (1992) on the optimality of short patents when imitation is costly
is robust to extensions. In the second essay, technological progress may make pat-
ented ideas obsolescent before their patents expire and, accordingly, expanded
protection involves an increase in the probability of ideas being no longer useful in
reaching the public domain. The principal finding reached in the third essay main-
tains that a decrease in patent life might lead to a surge of new technologies into
the market. There may also be other reasons for the optimality of relatively short
patent life, investigation of which is left to future research. For instance, a shorter
patent term might reduce patent disputes, especially such as those in the Micronas
case over the rights to the improvements of licensed technologies, whereas Lan-
jouw and Lerner (1997) report some evidence of the likelihood of patent disputes
being unaffected by patent breadth. In consequence, provided that the policy tools
are substitutes as regard their impact on innovation, shorter but broader patent
protection would result in a decline in the number of costly litigation processes.
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4.2 Beyond the Scope of this Dissertation
There are many significant issues in the economics of intellectual property protec-
tion that neither previous research nor this thesis addresses adequately, if at all.
Foremost among these is the question about the optimal system of intellectual
property rights globally. Let us first emphasise the word ‘optimal’. The current
system of intellectual property protection was designed long ago to satisfy the re-
quirements of economies essentially different from ours. Perhaps the time has
come for a thorough rethinking of the whole system, as strongly urged by Thurow
(1997). In this task it is better to forget the existing institutions and instead simply
ask, what the optimal incentive mechanism for innovation is and how to implement
it. This point is pursued to some extent in interesting recent papers by Cremer and
Scotchmer (1997) and Kremer (1998).
As to the word ‘global’, economic analysis of the global system of intellectual
property rights is still in its infancy despite the Paris Convention being signed in
1883 to create a mechanism for world-wide patent grant coordination. Moreover,
the legislation to protect intellectual property has recently been harmonised within
the European Union and there is a strong pressure to harmonise it globally. The
economic implications of the global system of intellectual property rights involve a
number of delicate aspects, not least because of the special difficulties of less-
developed countries. The historical experience in Germany, Holland, Japan and
Switzerland suggests that it may initially be advantageous to have weak intellectual
property protection. Only when the technological skills in a country have pro-
gressed to a sufficiently high level is it profitable to strengthen intellectual property
rights to accelerate the development of the domestic innovation industry.
This points directly to a thin line between intellectual property protection and
strategic trade policy. Given that Spencer and Brander’s (1983) trail-blazing work
in strategic trade theory deals with R&D subsides, it is surprising to find that the
subsequent developers of the theory have omitted this line, notwithstanding the
role of product standards. Such an omission is difficult to justify. The history of the
patent institution illustrates its use as a strategic weapon in trade policy right from
the beginning.18 It is perhaps here worth mentioning a finding in the second essay
providing some indirect support for the claim in Spero (1990) and Ordover (1991)
that the advantages of the Japanese patent system, which is characterised by a weak
novelty criterion, stem from the strategic dimensions of trade policy.
Putting aside these problematic issues rooted in international trade and the dis-
persion of economic development across countries, there is a relatively straight-
forward way to approach the economics of the globally optimal system of intel-
lectual property protection. It seems that the current international intellectual prop-
erty laws enable innovators to optimise the geographical scope of protection, and
this feature of the laws could be beneficial for global welfare, much as the renewal
fees may be welfare-enhancing in Cornelli and Pakes (1996) and Scotchmer (1998)
(cf. also section 2.2). One should, however, take the development dimension seri-
ously. The endogenous-growth literature, including notable contributions by Ro-
                                                     
18
 For some intriguing historical details, see e.g. Penrose (1951), Kaufer (1986) and Long (1991) In
particular, one objective of the Paris Convention was to settle the problems associated with the
strategic use of patent law in international trade in the 19th century. For a comprehensive discussion
of the international aspects of intellectual property protection, see Wallerstein, Mogee, and Schoen
(1993).
34
mer (1990) and Kortum (1997), clearly recognise the demand for intellectual prop-
erty rights to boost economic growth, but until recently there has been surprisingly
little interest in exploring how various aspects of intellectual property protection do
actually influence growth. O’Donoghue and Zweimüller (1998) finally make up
some of the deficiency and examine the effects of patent policy by employing an
endogenous-growth model. They simultaneously elaborate the theory of intellec-
tual property protection by evaluating patent policy in a general equilibrium
framework, as these growth models typically have a general equilibrium character.
Herein lies another largely neglected area.
As explained in section 3.2, the evaluation of optimal patent protection, not to
mention other instruments of technology policy, is usually carried out in isolation
from the rest of the economy. This is particularly unsatisfactory when one would
like to investigate technology policy as a whole, even though partial equilibrium
analyses such as Romano (1989), Leahy and Neary (1997), Petrakis and Poyago-
Theotoky (1997), Hinloopen (1997, 1998), and Stenbacka and Tombak (1998)
have provided important insights into the interplay between various policy tools.
The principal tools of technology policy, cooperative research, intellectual property
rights, and subsidies, undeniably create distortions and have various advantages.
Finding the best balance between these tools requires a general equilibrium frame-
work. In the context of endogenous-growth theory, the task should in principle be
accomplished, first by combining O’Donoghue and Zweimüller’s (1998) model
with Davidson and Segerstrom’s (1998) study of R&D subsidies and growth and
then adding appropriate organisational ingredients. Alternatively, one could adapt a
standard public economics approach, a natural point of departure being the general
equilibrium model of taxation and imperfect competition, described e.g. in Myles
(1995) and Pirttilä (1998).
An economy-wide emphasis does not mean that the microfoundations of the
economics of intellectual property protection have thoroughly been explored. Sev-
eral challenges remain. A topical question is who should own intellectual property.
This question clearly has philosophical aspects, and it is no surprise that philo-
sophical arguments in addition to the economic ones have often been put for and
against protection of intellectual property. Consider, for instance, the word ‘natu-
ral’ in the quotation from Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations in the Introduction.
For economists the question is about efficiency – what innovation ownership
structure would maximise social welfare? This question is pursued in Aghion and
Tirole (1994a, 1994b) but otherwise there has been little research interest on this
topic.
Currently the inventors and the authors in principle hold the property rights to
their works, but in practice this right is held by their employers. This satisfies the
basic assumption of optimal risk-sharing that all risk should be borne by those less
risk-averse, but the task then translates into designing an appropriate incentive
scheme to produce inventions. Unlike in the private sector, the right to the inven-
tions in universities in all Nordic countries, Germany and Switzerland is held by
the inventor rather than the university. The recent change in the law in the US giv-
ing universities the right to retain title to and to licence inventions has stimulated
economic research on the optimal ownership of intellectual property in this par-
ticular institutional setting. See Jensen and Thursby (1998) for an elegant piece of
such research. There is also a considerable policy debate about this issue going on
in Finland (see e.g. Taloussanomat 6.11.1998 and Helsingin Sanomat 9.11.1998).
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In general, the role of intellectual property in organisational design relates to an
unsolved puzzle of human-capital loss. Why is the departure of key R&D person-
nel a considerable threat in high-technology companies as well as public-sector
research teams, as also pointed out in the fourth essay? Why can the human capital
critical for the future economic success of private corporations and other institu-
tions not be prevented from leaking out? Severinov (1997) makes a preliminary
attempt to tackle this problem but it still remains far from solved. Beside taking
into account intellectual property ownership arrangements, unravelling this puzzle
seems to require considering the performance of the labour market and redistribu-
tional institutions. Such considerations, properly conducted, may even unravel a
much greater mystery in economics. Could the ownership structure of intellectual
property be the long-sought origin of permanent inequality?
Turning now to other unanswered questions directly relating to the essays in
this dissertation, why has search theory been forgotten in the economics of intel-
lectual property protection, although it was introduced into the economics of inno-
vation by Evenson and Kislev (1976) and Weitzman (1979)? One can also justifia-
bly ask whether there are alternative and more fruitful ways to model innovation
than the extensively used Poisson process, even while recalling that the line of re-
search leading to Poisson distribution began with a general payoff distribution (see
e.g. Kamien and Schwartz, 1974b). The second essay in this dissertation demon-
strates how the Poisson discovery rate arises from a search model as a special case.
The next step in research is perhaps to direct effort towards the interaction theory
of intellectual property protection and the theory of dynamic R&D competition in a
setting in which the pay-off distribution of R&D investments is explicitly mod-
elled. With a recent wave of Bayesian learning models, such as Bolton and Harris
(1993), Moscarini and Smith (1997), Bergemann and Välimäki (1998), this should
no longer be impractical.
Yet another important but largely overlooked issue is copyright protection,
whose importance is only growing with the rise of the Internet. While there are a
few papers dealing with the economics of copyright, it is fair to say that the label-
ling of copyright protection as against patents is usually more a matter of conven-
ience than the result of a conscious effort to make a distinction between an idea and
an expression, a distinction which is a salient feature of copyright law. A step in
this direction is taken in Essay 2 of this thesis, but the treatment remains inade-
quate in several respects. Ideally, one would like to have a model incorporating
various technologies to innovate and imitate, and heterogeneous consumer prefer-
ences in order to be able to distinguish expressions from ideas. This would provide
a fruitful ground for the attempt to assess the suitability of various intellectual
property laws for discoveries in a wide range of industries. The most obvious and
urgent reform in the current system of intellectual property rights is to make it in-
dustry-specific.
In doing the case-study included in the fourth essay, we eschewed exploring a
number of interesting questions. As a reader of this essay will no doubt notice these
questions, only one of them is now explained. Determining the optimal trading
mechanism in general is important, but seemingly a complex challenge. In par-
ticular, it is unclear why trades are often consummated by bargaining rather than
auctions, even if the theory unambiguously predicts the superiority of auctions
from the seller’s point of view. A special case of this general problem category is
the licensing of patented innovations. As Kamien’s (1992) careful account of the
early licensing literature clarifies, according to the theory the licensor’s profit can
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be maximised by employing auctions. This contrasts strikingly with real-world ex-
perience.
Jensen and Thursby (1998) hint that the reason for this contrast between theory
and practice in licensing lies in the search frictions, and this may indeed be an ex-
planation of the extensive use of bargaining as shown in Kultti (1997), at least in
limited circumstances. But as our case also suggests, the buyer of technology can
also let the sellers compete in an auction. Indeed, one result of our own research in
this area (Kultti and Takalo, 1998) predicts the superiority of auctions over bar-
gaining even when the agents can choose freely whether to wait or to search, pro-
vided that the agents can also commit themselves to a particular trading institution.
A final remark on this problem emerging from our case study is that such a
commitment is often not feasible in practice, indicating that bargaining may be an
equilibrium trading mechanism because of contract incompleteness. For instance,
Seiko, Micro Power Systems’s main share-holder, was able to transform the li-
censing process from an auction to bargaining and managed to alter the licensing
contract to its advantage, and in the building project for the manufacturing plant
the building company tried to achieve the same change. Transaction cost econo-
mists have long insisted that such transformations from auctions to bargaining
should be a central concern in the study of contracting, Williamson (1985, 1989)
even refers it to as the ‘fundamental transformation’. Although this view is no
doubt justifed, my conjecture is that the possibility of the ‘fundamental transfor-
mation’ only affects initial bids, leaving the sellers’ and buyers’ final payoffs un-
changed.
One case cannot by definition hope to establish a proof of general propositions,
but it can shed light on the opportunities in pursuing large-sample examinations.
For instance, it would be intriguing to know whether asymmetric information at the
moment of writing a contract is an inherent problem of patent licensing, or an
imaginary problem of economists. This directs us to the ultimate question of theory
and evidence.
Despite the spectacular growth of theoretical literature over the past 30 years,
few general predictions in the economics of intellectual property protection have
emerged. It should be evident to every open-minded economist that the theory in-
cludes a large number of ‘empty economic boxes’, a notion attributed to Clapham
(1922) which describes logically consistent economic models providing little em-
pirical cutting edge. Against this background, empirical research with sound theo-
retical foundations has become crucial to progress in these areas. It is perhaps
merely wishful thinking that a theory can be built and always verified against evi-
dence within a single piece of research. But a box is not worth making unless one
has something to put in it.
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